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A FORK IN THE STREAM: 
THE UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE CONCURRENCE IN J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY 
LTD. V. NICASTRO TO CLARIFY THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE 
Cody Jacobs* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A foreign manufacturer sells a product to an American distributor in State A, who then 
resells the product to an American consumer in State B.  The consumer is injured by the product 
and attempts to sue the foreign manufacturer in State B.  Can State B exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the manufacturer?  This deceptively simple and seemingly common question, 
and related questions involving the so-called ‘stream of commerce’ have fractured the United 
States Supreme Court for over 20 years, leaving consumers, manufacturers and distributors 
unsure of their rights and potential liabilities.  This article is about a recent missed opportunity 
the Court had to solve that problem, and why two of its Members erred in declining to do so. 
 
In 1987, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,1 the Court split four to four on 
the level of ‘purposeful availment’ of a particular state’s laws a foreign manufacturer must 
engage in to trigger the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer.  Two 
opinions for four Justices each presented competing approaches to this problem.  One approach 
allowed jurisdiction to be asserted whenever a manufacturer placed its wares into the stream of 
commerce with the knowledge or expectation that those goods were likely to end up in a 
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particular state.  Another approach required ‘something more’ before jurisdiction could be 
asserted to show that the manufacturer specifically intended to target the forum at issue.  This 
split left lower courts without clear guidance on this issue and created uncertainty for litigators 
and companies in an area of the law that was already without many ‘bright line’ rules. 
 
In 2011, it seemed as if the Court was going to finally clear up this ambiguity in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,2 a case with facts roughly similar to the question presented 
in Asahi.  However, the Court again could not come up with five votes for one particular test.  A 
plurality of four Justices essentially supported the ‘something more’ approach, while a dissent 
for three Justices supported something akin to the ‘knowledge or expectation’ approach outlined 
in Asahi.  Justices Breyer and Alito, concurring in the judgment, declined to choose between 
these competing approaches because they felt Nicastro presented an inappropriate vehicle to 
decide this issue since it did not concern issues of modern technology, such as issues raised by 
the internet. 
 
This article critiques that concurrence by arguing that either of the competing approaches to 
the stream of commerce test presented in Asahi and reiterated in Nicastro would be preferable to 
the current uncertainty in this area of the law.  This article argues that modern technology does 
not significantly change the calculus in this area because a relatively well-established test for 
evaluating internet ‘contacts’ already exists and would be largely unaffected by the choice 
between the two approaches to the stream of commerce doctrine.  Part II describes the history of 
the Supreme Court’s modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence starting with International Shoe 
                                                 
2 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). 
and ending with Asahi.  Specifically, it focuses on the development of two principles in personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence during this time period and the tension between those two concepts: 
the requirement of purposeful availment and the expansion of the stream of commerce test.  Part 
III examines Nicastro itself and the reaction to that decision.  Part IV discusses why a clear rule 
is particularly desirable and important in this area both for practical reasons and for doctrinal 
consistency with other due process clause jurisprudence.  Part V explains why the concerns 
expressed by the Nicastro concurrence about modern technology should not be an impediment to 
choosing between the two competing approaches to the stream of commerce theory.  Finally, 
Part VI concludes with the hope that the next time the Supreme Court confronts this issue; a 
majority of Justices will be able to choose one of these approaches to provide a little more clarity 
for companies, consumers, litigators, and courts. 
 
II. History Of The Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence And The Stream Of 
Commerce Theory 
 
In the years leading up the Court’s 1987 decision in Asahi, two trends emerged that 
seemed to be at loggerheads with each other.  On the one hand, the Court consistently required 
some sort of intent on the part of the defendant to avail itself of the forum before personal 
jurisdiction could be exercised.3  At the same time, the scope of personal jurisdiction expanded 
to adapt to the realities of the rapidly expanding national and global marketplace4 and some 
lower courts advocated a “steam of commerce” test whereby the act of placing a chattel into the 
                                                 
3 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75. 
4 See Lindy Burris Arwood, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping Up with (Internet) Traffic?, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 967, 997-98 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s expansion of personal jurisdiction in the second 
half of the twentieth century in response to the modern market place and modern technology). 
stream of commerce where it was likely to end up in a particular forum was enough to subject a 
defendant to jurisdiction in that forum.5 
 
The Court had an opportunity to reconcile these issues in Asahi, but instead produced a 
fractured opinion, with four Justices favoring a stricter test of purposeful availment6 and four 
Justices favoring adoption of a broad version of the “stream of commerce” test.7    
 
a. Background 
 
Modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence began with the famous case of International 
Shoe v. Washington.8  There, the defendant, a Delaware corporation, hired a team of salesmen to 
sell shoes in Washington.9  The state of Washington sought to collect certain taxes from the 
defendant and the defendant refused arguing, among other things, that it was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Washington.10  
 
                                                 
5 See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised 
Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 259 (1989) (“Under this standard, as liberally interpreted, jurisdiction was upheld not 
only over manufacturers who intentionally marketed their products in the forum but over manufacturers who merely 
knew or should have known that their products would or could reach the forum.”). 
6 480 U.S. at 112 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.). 
7 Id. at 116-18 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
9 Id. at 313-14. 
10 Id. at 312-14. 
The Court used this case to move away from traditional rules of personal jurisdiction that 
only allowed the assertion of jurisdiction when a defendant was physically present in a forum.11  
Instead, the Court turned the focus to whether a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with 
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”12  In the context of corporate defendants the Court noted that whether 
the Due Process Clause allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction “must depend . . . upon the 
quality and nature of the activity [engaged in by the corporation in the forum] in relation to the 
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause 
[sic] to ensure.”13  The Court went on to hold that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper in that 
case because the defendant’s operations in Washington had “resulted in a large volume of 
interstate business, in the course of which [the defendant] received the benefits and protections” 
of the laws of Washington, and “the current suit arose out of those very activities.”14 
 
In the years since International Shoe, the Court refined the test for personal jurisdiction 
into one having two distinct requirements.  First, the defendant must have sufficient minimum 
contacts with the forum to avail itself of the laws of the forum.15  For corporate defendants, these 
sorts of contacts typically involve things such as having offices in the forum, conducting 
                                                 
11 Id. at 316. 
12 Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)) 
13 326 U.S. at 319. 
14 Id. at 320. 
15 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (contacts for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction are “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). 
business in the forum, sending employees to the forum or advertising in the forum.16  Second, 
even if minimum contacts are established, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be consistent 
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”17  “[T]he reasonableness of the 
exercise of  jurisdiction in each case . . . depend[s] on an evaluation of several factors[:]”  the 
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
relief.18  A court must also consider “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”19 
 
The Supreme Court has also delineated two different types of personal jurisdiction, 
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.20  General jurisdiction allows a state to hear any 
and all claims against a corporation, whether or not those claims are connected to the state’s 
contacts with the state.21  A showing that general jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign 
corporation requires that the corporation have “affiliations with the State [which] are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state.”22  This is a 
                                                 
16 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984) (examining a corporation’s 
contacts with a state including purchases supplies from the state, sending an executive to the state to negotiate a deal 
and sending employees to the state for trainings); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (noting the defendant’s lack of 
advertising in the forum, offices in the forum or business conducted in the forum).   
17 See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (quoting World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
20 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 2853-54 (2011); 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn. 8, 9. 
21 See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851. 
22 Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). 
high bar,23 and the Supreme Court has found the exercise of general jurisdiction appropriate in 
only a single case in the sixty-five years since International Shoe was decided.24  Perhaps in part 
because of the difficult standard required for general jurisdiction, after “the emergence of 
specific jurisdiction in the twentieth century, the exercise of general jurisdiction has become 
rare.”25 
 
Specific jurisdiction arises when the claim against the defendant is connected to the 
defendant’s activities within the forum.26  Specific jurisdiction is triggered when (1) the 
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,”27 which gives rise to a court’s 
ability to adjudicate “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 
establishes jurisdiction.”28 It is in these sorts of cases that the controversy over the “stream of 
commerce” test has arisen.29 
 
                                                 
23 See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the standard for 
general jurisdiction "is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a 
defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.") 
24 That case was Perkins v. Benguet Bonsol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), where the Court upheld Ohio’s 
exercise of general jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation where the company was essentially run from Ohio 
during World War II.  Id. at 437, 447-48.  
25 See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988); see also Taylor 
Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 130 (2012) 
(opining that Goodyear represented “the final nail into the coffin of the doctrine of general personal jurisdiction.”) 
26 See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2854 (collecting cases). 
27 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
28 See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851. 
29 Cf. id. at 2855 (noting that the stream of commerce test is relevant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry, not general 
jurisdiction). 
b. Purposeful Availment  
 
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court has 
required that, in order to be subject to specific jurisdiction, a defendant must engage in “some act 
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum.”30  In Hanson, a woman living in Pennsylvania executed a deed of trust making a 
Delaware trust company the trustee of some of her assets.31  Several years after executing the 
trust, the woman moved to Florida, where she later died.32  Upon her death, one of the 
beneficiaries of her will brought a declaratory judgment action in Florida seeking to have the 
trust voided.33  The beneficiaries of the trust argued that the Florida court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company, an indispensible party.34 
 
The Supreme Court held that Florida courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the Delaware trust company.35   The Court noted that although it may have been relatively easy 
for the defendant to respond to this suit, the restrictions placed on jurisdiction by the Due Process 
Clause “are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.”36  
Instead, the Clause requires that “the defendant purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 
                                                 
30 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see, e.g. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-76 (noting the Court’s frequent reliance on the 
purposeful availment requirement from Hanson). 
31 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238. 
32 Id. at 239. 
33 Id. at 240-41. 
34 Id. at 240-42. 
35 Id. at 251. 
36See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”37  Here, the Court found that the trust company had virtually no contacts with Florida at 
all other than the decedent’s decision to move there after creating the trust.38  “The unilateral 
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 
requirement of contact with the forum State.”39  
 
The Supreme Court continued its focus on the defendant’s actions and intentions in 
World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.40  There, a family bought a car from a dealership in New 
York and later drove the car across the country where they got in a car accident in Oklahoma and 
the car caught on fire, injuring the family.41  The family sued the car dealership and the 
distributor of the car (also based in New York, which distributed cars in New York, New Jersey 
and Connecticut)42 in a products liability action in Oklahoma state court.43  The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction was appropriate, despite the lack of contacts 
between the defendants and Oklahoma, because a car, “by its very design and purpose” is 
mobile, so the defendants could foresee that it could end up in Oklahoma.44 
 
                                                 
37 Id. at 253. 
38 Id. at 251. 
39 Id. 
40 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
41 Id. at 288. 
42 The plaintiffs also sued the manufacturer of the car, a German corporation, and its importer, however neither of 
those parties challenged the assertion of personal jurisdiction over them by the Oklahoma court.  See id. at 288 & 
n.3. 
43 Id. 
44 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978). 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach and held that the defendants were not subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.45  The Court noted that “foreseeability alone has never 
been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”46  The 
Court argued that because it is foreseeable that all kinds of products could be moved after they 
are sold that adopting an approach focused on foreseeability would result in “[e]very seller of 
chattels[,] . . . in effect[,] appoint[ing] the chattel his agent for service of process.”47 
 
The Court explained, however, that foreseeability did have an important role in the 
personal jurisdiction inquiry: 
 
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. 
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not 
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum 
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with 
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 
“orderly administration of the laws," International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U. S., at 319, gives a degree of predictability to 
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their 
                                                 
45 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. 
46 Id. at 259 (quotations omitted). 
47 Id. at 296. 
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.48 
 
Thus, the Court held that here, since the defendants did not take any action to avail themselves of 
Oklahoma’s laws that would put them on notice that they could be subject to suit there, personal 
jurisdiction could not be asserted.49  
 
c. The Stream of Commerce Theory 
 
At the same time the Court was focusing on the intentions of the defendant, however, it 
was also expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction in recognition of evolving commerce and 
technology.  The Court explicitly acknowledged this trend in McGee v. International Life 
Insurance,50 where the Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by California courts over a non-
resident insurance company where that company had entered into an insurance contract with a 
California resident and that contract was the subject of the litigation, even where the company 
had no other contacts with California.51  After describing the recent history of the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence the Court noted: 
 
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly 
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state 
                                                 
48 Id. at 297 (citations omitted). 
49 Id. 
50 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
51 Id. at 223. 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In 
part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our 
national economy over the years. Today many commercial 
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties 
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization 
of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business 
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern 
transportation and communication have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he 
engages in economic activity.52 
 
The Court’s acknowledgement of the influence of technology on commerce is even more striking 
in light of the fact that McGee was decided in 1957.53 
 
 Building off of this acknowledgement, the Supreme Court of Illinois first enunciated the 
stream of commerce test in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.54 In that case, 
the defendant, an Ohio corporation, sold a safety valve to a company in Pennsylvania which 
incorporated the valve into its water heater, and then sold that heater to a consumer in Illinois.55  
The water heater exploded and injured the consumer, and the consumer brought a product 
                                                 
52 Id. at 222-23. 
53 See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“The historical developments noted in McGee of course, have only 
accelerated in the generation since that case was decided”).  
54 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); see also, e.g., Murphy, supra note 5, at 256 (noting that Gray is “the case from which the 
stream of commerce theory originated”). 
55 176 N.E.2d at 764. 
liability action against the defendant in Illinois state court.56  The defendant argued that it had 
insufficient contacts with Illinois to be subject to personal jurisdiction there.57 
 
 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it was sufficient for personal 
jurisdiction purposes if “the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with the 
State.”58  The court began its analysis by examining recent Supreme Court cases, including 
McGee, as well as recent cases from other states expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction to 
account for modern business practices.59  Then, the court explained the rationale for the stream 
of commerce theory: 
 
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the 
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a 
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States. The 
fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, 
however, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of 
his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action 
arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of 
such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient 
                                                 
56 Id. at 762.  The defendant apparently had no other contacts with the state of Illinois, but the court did observe that 
it was a “reasonable inference” that some of its products (other than the particular valve at issue) ended up being 
substantially used and consumed within Illinois.  See id. at 764, 766. 
57 Id. at 762. 
58 Id. at 764. 
59 Id. at 764-66. 
contact with this State to justify a requirement that he defend 
here.60  
 
Thus, the court held that the defendant could be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois 
because it could have reasonably assumed that the water heater containing its valves would be 
sold in Illinois.61 
 
 Many courts subsequently adopted Gray’s approach, and focused on whether or not it 
was foreseeable that a product put into the stream of commerce would end up in the place where 
the injury occurred.62  However, other courts were reluctant to adopt it, or at least to go as far as 
Gray had because of the Supreme Court’s requirement in Hanson that a defendant purposefully 
avail itself of the forum.63 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in World Wide Volkswagen appeared to clear up some of 
the confusion by rejecting total reliance on foreseeability.64  However, the Court also seemed to 
implicitly endorse at least some version of the stream of commerce test: 
 
                                                 
60 Id. at 766. 
61 See id. at 766. 
62 Murphy, supra note 5, at 259 & nn. 77,78,79. 
63 Id. at 260 (citing Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978)) 
(rejecting jurisdiction in Arkansas over an Italian corporation whose product reached Arkansas through a British 
intermediary, in part because there was no showing that the defendant had intentionally availed itself of Arkansas’ 
laws)). 
64 See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97; see also Part II(b), supra. 
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . 
is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of 
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the 
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to 
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective 
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to 
others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due 
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation 
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
State. Cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961).65 
 
Without any explanation of what was meant by “expectation” in the context of the stream of 
commerce, the Court’s opinion in World Wide Volkswagen left the fate of the stream of 
commerce theory unclear.66  
 
d. Asahi 
 
The Court had an opportunity to clarify things in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court.67  There, one of the defendants, a Japanese corporation (Asahi) which manufactured tire 
                                                 
65 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (emphasis added). 
66 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 270. 
67 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
valve assemblies, sold its products to a tire manufacturer in Taiwan which sold its tires in 
California.68  One of the tires was involved in a motorcycle accident in California and the 
plaintiff sued the Taiwanese manufacturer, which in turn sued Asahi seeking indemnification.69  
The Supreme Court of California upheld jurisdiction over Asahi because, although Asahi had no 
contacts with California, it had intentionally placed its products into the stream of commerce 
with the awareness that some of the components would eventually be sold in California.70 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.71  An eight Justice majority,72 in an opinion 
by Justice O’Connor, held that, whether or not Asahi had sufficient minimum contacts with 
California to satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, exercising jurisdiction in 
this context would not be consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 
as required by the second prong.73  The Court noted that while it would be very inconvenient for 
Asahi to defend itself in California, the state of California and the plaintiff (the Taiwanese 
company) had only a “slight” interest in adjudicating the suit in California.74  The Court’s 
agreement, however, ended there. 
 
                                                 
68 Id. at 106. 
69 Id. at 106. 
70 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 550 (1985). 
71 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108. 
72 Justice Scalia did not join this portion of the opinion. 
73 Id. at 113. 
74 Id. at 114-15. 
In a portion of her opinion joined by three other Justices,75 Justice O’Connor rejected the 
expansive version of the stream of commerce theory exemplified by the California Supreme 
Court’s decision.76  She stressed that the minimum contacts that give rise to personal jurisdiction 
“must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”77  
Given that principle, this group of Justices would have held that “a defendant’s awareness that 
the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the 
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the 
forum state.”78  Instead, a defendant must exhibit “[a]dditional conduct” to indicate an intent or 
purpose to serve the market in the forum state such as advertising in the forum or designing a 
product for the market in that forum.79  Since Asahi had exhibited no such additional conduct, 
Justice O’Connor would have found its contacts with California insufficient to satisfy due 
process.80    
 
Justice Brennan, in an opinion also joined by three other Justices,81 sharply disagreed 
with Justice O’Connor’s approach.82  This group of Justices argued that because “[t]he stream of 
commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow 
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale,” a lawsuit in a forum where a final 
                                                 
75 Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia.  
76 Id. at 112 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.). 
77 Id. (emphasis in original). 
78 Id. 
79 480 U.S. at 112. 
80 Id. at 112-13. 
81 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. 
82 See id. at 116-18 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
product was being marketed “cannot come as a surprise” to a defendant manufacturer of 
component parts like Asahi.83  Justice Brennan noted, echoing the court in Gray, that a 
manufacturer who places its product into the stream of commerce in this manner “indirectly 
benefits from the [forum] State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.”84  Thus, 
he concluded that because Asahi was aware of the distribution system that carried its valves into 
California and knew that that distribution system would benefit it economically, sufficient 
minimum contacts had been established for California to assert jurisdiction over Asahi under the 
first prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.85 
 
Justice Stevens, although he said he was “inclined” to agree with Justice Brennan’s 
conclusion, did not join either opinion because the determination of the minimum contacts issue 
was unnecessary to the decision in the case in light of the majority’s conclusion that asserting 
jurisdiction here was not in accord with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.86  
 
Thus, Asahi did not reconcile the stream of commerce test with the purposeful availment 
requirement.  Following Asahi, lower courts were left to choose for themselves whether to follow 
Justice Brennan’s approach, Justice O’Connor’s approach or some combination of the two.  
                                                 
83 Id. at 117. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 121. 
86 See id. at 121-22 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).  Justice Stevens’ opinion was also joined by Justices White and 
Blackmun. 
Unsurprisingly, this created a split in authority, with a fairly even number of courts applying 
each approach and several courts trying to apply both approaches.87   
 
III. Nicastro 
 
After Asahi, it would be another twenty-four years before the Court revisited the stream 
of commerce test.88  Finally, the Court took an opportunity to address this issue in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.89 
 
The facts of Nicastro were fairly straightforward.  The plaintiff was injured while using a 
metal recycling machine at his workplace in New Jersey.90  The manufacturer of the machine 
was a company incorporated in the United Kingdom.91  That company sold the machine at issue 
to its distributor in the United States, based in Ohio, which then sold the machine to the 
plaintiff’s New Jersey employer.92  Although the manufacturer had no direct contacts with New 
Jersey, its president had attended several trade shows in Nevada to promote the machine, one of 
                                                 
87 See Dustin Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 115-116 & nn. 60, 61, 62 (2012) 
(collecting cases applying each approach and avoiding the question).  Some courts and commentators refer to Justice 
O’Connor’s approach as the “stream of commerce-plus” approach and refer to Justice Brennan’s approach simply as 
the “stream of commerce” theory.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472, 
479-80 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the “stream of commerce plus” approach and noting the varying approaches other 
courts have taken).   
88 In fact, the Court barely addressed personal jurisdiction issues at all during this period, with the exception being 
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), where a divided Court affirmed the assertion of 
jurisdiction over a defendant who had insufficient minimum contacts with the state under International Shoe, but 
was physically present in the state when he was served with process.  
89 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). 
90 Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
91 Id. at 577. 
92 Id. at 578. 
which was attended by a representative from the plaintiff’s employer.93  The plaintiff sued both 
the distributor94 and the manufacturer in New Jersey state court, but the manufacturer argued that 
it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.95 
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that New Jersey courts could exercise 
jurisdiction over the manufacturer.96  First, the court noted that the manufacturer did not have 
any contacts with New Jersey that would ordinarily justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, 
so the exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer “must sink or swim with the stream of 
commerce theory of jurisdiction.”97  Next, the court surveyed the history of the United States 
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as well as its own, and noted “[t]he 
expanding reach of a state court’s jurisdiction, as permitted by due process, has reflected . . . 
historical developments” in the nature of the economy and technology.98  Against this backdrop, 
the court reaffirmed earlier New Jersey law following Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion; “[a] 
foreign manufacturer will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if it knows or reasonably should 
know that through its distribution scheme its products are being sold in New Jersey.”99   
                                                 
93 Id. at 579. 
94 The distributor apparently filed for bankruptcy before the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred and, as of the 
date of the Supreme Court’s opinion “ha[d] not participated in th[e] lawsuit.”  See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2796 n.2 
(GINSBURG, J. dissenting).  The fact that the distributor was bankrupt, leaving the plaintiff potentially without 
anyone to seek recovery from in New Jersey, or even anywhere in the United States, was an issue of concern to 
some Justices at oral argument.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12:11-13:1, Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (No. 09-
1343). 
95 See Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578. 
96 Id. at 577. 
97 Id. at 582. 
98 See id. at 582-589. 
99 Id. at 589-92. 
 Under that rule, the court found that if “[a] manufacturer that knows . . . its products are 
distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products to be sold 
in any [state] must expect that it will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its . . . 
products is sold to a New Jersey consumer[.]”100  Thus, the Court concluded that J. McIntyre 
knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution system might lead to its products 
entering New Jersey because representatives from the national distributor and the manufacturer 
attended trade shows in various cities around the country (albeit not in New Jersey).101  The 
Court reasoned that it was clear that those attending these trade shows came from areas other 
than the cities hosing those events, meaning that while “J. McIntyre may not have known the 
precise destination of [each of its products,] it clearly knew or should have known that its 
products were intended for sale and distribution to customers located anywhere in the United 
States.”102  Therefore, the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant 
was permissible. 
 
In a spirited dissenting opinion, Justice Hoens sharply criticized the majority for 
misconstruing both Asahi opinions and prior New Jersey law to effectively render “any effort by 
a manufacturer to sell its product anywhere in the nation as the only act needed for assertion of . . 
. jurisdiction.”103 The dissent argued that the majority’s analysis impermissibly moved the focus 
away from the actions of the defendant and towards a balancing of the burden on the defendant 
                                                 
100 Id. at 592. 
101 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 592. 
102 Id. at 592-93. 
103 Id. at 594 (HOENS, J., dissenting). 
and the benefit to the plaintiff of litigating in New Jersey.104  In a separate dissenting opinion, 
Justice Rivera-Soto presciently urged the United States Supreme Court to review the case.105 
 
a. The Court’s opinions 
 
In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed.106  However, despite 
a quarter century and the addition of eight new Justices since Asahi, the Court again produced no 
majority opinion, and ended up with a plurality and dissent echoing many of the same themes 
Justices O’Connor and Brennan argued over in Asahi so many years earlier.   
 
In an opinion for a plurality of four Justices,107 Justice Kennedy staked out a strong 
defense of Justice O’Connor’s position in Asahi.108  Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he stream of 
commerce, like other metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utility.”109  Justice Kennedy’s 
focus, like Justice O’Connor’s, was on the defendant’s specific intent.  Thus, while a defendant 
                                                 
104 See id. at 602-05. 
105 Id. at 605 (SOTO, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority ‘has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with’ settled federal constitutional principles, creates a new , unsubstantial, and meaningless standard for 
the unbounded exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, and disturbs the careful balance that limits the exercise of judicial 
power between and among the several states, this decision is ripe for review and correction by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 10(b)) (citation omitted). 
106 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion). 
107 Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. 
108 But see Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551, 1563 (2012) 
(“Whether Justice Kennedy's opinion is more stringent than Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi is unclear. 
The fact that Justice Kennedy requires targeting the forum could lead to different results when the manufacturer 
advertises in regional or national media. Justice O'Connor might find such advertising sufficient to show that the 
manufacturer had ‘an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State,’ while Justice Kennedy might find 
such advertising insufficiently targeted to give rise to jurisdiction.”). 
109 Id. at 2788. 
may subject itself to the jurisdiction of a state by introducing products into the stream of 
commerce in an effort to “seek to serve” a given state’s market, it cannot be subject to 
jurisdiction without some action that “manifest[s] an intention to submit to the power of the” 
state at issue.110  “[A]s a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted 
that its goods will reach a forum state.”111 
 
The plurality explicitly rejected Justice Brennan’s approach.  In the plurality’s view, 
Justice Brennan’s approach impermissibly “discarded the central concept of sovereign authority 
in favor of considerations of fairness and forseeability.”112  The plurality noted that although 
personal jurisdiction doctrine protects individual liberty, it does so by preserving the individual’s 
right to be subject only to lawful power, and the exercise of lawful power is dependent on 
whether the sovereign has the authority to render a judgment in a given case.113  Therefore, 
instead of fairness, the primary concern of the personal jurisdiction inquiry should be whether 
the defendant has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by “follow[ing] a course of conduct 
directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign.”114 
 
Under this analysis, the result required in this case was obvious: J. McIntyre could not be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey courts.  The plurality conceded that that the 
                                                 
110 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 2788-89. 
113 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2789.  
114 Id. 
defendant had directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States as a whole.115  In the 
plurality’s view however, this fact was irrelevant since the case involved a New Jersey state 
court attempting to exercise jurisdiction, thus it was the defendant’s “purposeful contacts with 
New Jersey, not with the United States, that alone [were] relevant.”116  Therefore, the fact that 
the defendant had engaged a distributor to sell its products into the United States did not reveal 
an intent to serve the New Jersey market in particular because the defendant had taken no action 
to target the New Jersey market such as advertising in New Jersey or directing its distributor to 
sell to specific New Jersey customers.117 
 
In a dissent for three Justices,118 Justice Ginsburg sharply disagreed.  In the dissent’s 
view, the plurality’s approach “turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm 
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court . . . need only Pilate-like wash its 
hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.”119  The dissent rejected the 
plurality’s distinction between directing products to the United States as a whole and directing 
products to a particular state.120  According to Justice Ginsburg, J. McIntyre’s arrangement with 
its US distributor was “illustrative of marketing arrangements for sales in the United States 
common in today’s commercial world.  A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U.S. company 
                                                 
115 Id. at 2790. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 2790-91. 
118 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. 
119 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2794-95 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 2797, 2799. 
to promote and distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any particular State, but anywhere 
and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract purchasers.”121 
 
While declining to specifically side with Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion over Justice 
O’Connor’s,122 the dissent did mount a strong defense of notions of fairness and convenience 
factoring into personal jurisdiction analysis: 
 
The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other 
legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place 
to reason and fairness. Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode 
of trading of which this case is an example, to require the 
international seller to defend at the place its products cause injury? 
Do not litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations 
point in that direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can 
it be considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New 
Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its 
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United 
States? Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey 
fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting business internationally, 
in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, 
                                                 
121 Id. at 2799. 
122 See id. at 2803 (noting that in light of the Court’s agreement in Asahi that subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction 
did not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, “the dueling opinions of Justice Brennan 
and Justice O’Connor were hardly necessary.”); see also id. (finding Asahi distinguishable because it did not involve 
a California plaintiff and Asahi was a component parts manufacturer who had “little control over the final 
destination of its products”) (citations and quotations omitted).  
England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using 
McIntyre’s product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New 
Jersey?123  
 
Although the dissent would still take into account the defendant’s intent, it would do so in 
a much more general way than the plurality.  In the dissent’s view, the purposeful availment 
requirement “simply ‘ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a 
result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’' or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”124  It does not prevent the assertion of 
jurisdiction where a manufacturer, like J. McIntyre, hires a distributor knowing it is likely that 
distributor will sell its products in a particular forum.125 
 
The dissent suggested a possible distinction between cases involving local plaintiffs 
injured by the activity of a defendant seeking to exploit a multi-state or global market and cases 
involving defendants whose economic activities are “largely home-based” who do not have 
“designs to gain substantial revenue from distant markets.”126  In the latter cases, the dissent 
found that the place where the product at issue causes injury seems to usually be the most 
                                                 
123 Id. at 2800-01. 
124 Id. at 2801-02 (citation omitted). 
125 See id. at 2801 (“How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell 
products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap 
metal market?”). 
126 Id. at 2804. 
appropriate place for a suit.127 From this framework, the dissent would have found that J. 
McIntyre could be subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.128   
 
In a concurrence joined by Justice Alito, Justice Breyer expressly declined to endorse 
either the plurality or the dissent’s approach.129  He began by noting that the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey’s opinion had adopted a “broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction” 
based on its view of increasing globalization and recent changes in communication 
technology.130  However, in Justice Breyer’s view, this case did not present any of the issues 
raised by modern technology and commerce, thus making it an inappropriate vehicle to “mak[e] 
broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”131 
 
According to the concurrence, this case could be decided on the narrow grounds that the 
defendant had sold only a single machine in New Jersey.132 Justice Breyer argued that in Asahi, 
all the Members of the Court agreed that a single sale of a product in a state cannot form an 
adequate basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant even where the 
defendant places its goods in the stream of commerce, “fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2804.  Justice Ginsburg also noted that she took “heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the 
Court, for that opinion would take a giant step away from the “notions of fair play and substantial justice” underling 
International Shoe[.]”  Id. 
129 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2791, 2792-93 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). 
130 Id. at 2791. 
131 Id. at 2791, 2792-93. 
132 See id. at 2791-92  
will take place.133  Such an isolated sale, in the concurrence’s view, was not enough to show the 
“‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey required for the assertion of 
jurisdiction under any formulation of the stream of commerce test.134 
 
The concurrence argued that both the plurality and the dissent’s approach would present 
unanticipated and potentially negative consequences if applied to situations raised by modern 
commerce.  Justice Breyer took the plurality to task for stating what he implicitly suggested was 
an overly strict rule limiting jurisdiction to situations where the defendant specifically intends to 
submit to the power of the sovereign at issue: 
 
But what do those standards mean when a company targets the 
world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if, 
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the 
products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then 
receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets 
its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be 
viewed in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial 
consequences but are totally absent in this case.135  
                                                 
133 Id. at 2792 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-12 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (requiring “something more” than simply 
placing “a product into the stream of commerce,” even if defendant is “awar[e]” that the stream “may or will sweep 
the product into the forum State”); id., at 117 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) (jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a 
State is part of “the regular and anticipated flow” of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only an 
“edd[y],” i.e., an isolated occurrence); id., at 122 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(indicating that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry 
and emphasizing Asahi's “regular course of dealing”)). 
134 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2792 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted; alteration in original). 
135 Id. at 2793. 
 However, Justice Breyer went on to note that he did not agree with the “absolute approach 
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court” that in his view focused only on whether the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution system might lead to its 
products being sold in the forum at issue.136  Such an approach, the concurrence warned, could 
have seemingly unfair consequences: 
 
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which 
specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its 
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small 
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product 
(cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a 
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii). 
I know too little about the range of these or in-between 
possibilities to abandon in favor of the more absolute rule what has 
previously been this Court's less absolute approach. 
 
Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a 
domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute 
rule yet more uncertain. . . . [M]anufacturers come in many shapes 
and sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small 
Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a 
                                                 
136 Id. 
Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international 
distributors, to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually 
every State in the United States, even those in respect to which the 
foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single 
(allegedly defective) good.137  
 
Thus, Justice Breyer declined to pick between the plurality and the dissent, but implied 
that he might be more willing to “work such a change in the law” in a case that implicated the 
“relevant contemporary commercial circumstances.”138  Since in his view, this case did not 
implicate those issues and could be easily resolved by the fact that the defendant only sold a 
single product into New Jersey, Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment. 
  
b. The confusion created by the opinions 
 
The lack of a majority rationale in Nicastro, just like in Asahi so many years before, has 
generated some controversy, and perhaps provided the framework for defense arguments against 
jurisdiction in some stream of commerce cases, but has failed to provide courts and companies 
with clear guidance.  Although split decisions of the Court can occasionally still provide useful 
guidance for lower courts and the public, that is particularly unlikely here because of the 
extremely narrow grounds on which the “controlling” concurrence was based.  Indeed, as one 
court put it “[l]ike one of Dr. Rorschach's amorphous ink blots, Justice Breyer's opinion is 
                                                 
137 Id. at 2793-94. 
138 Id. at 2794. 
susceptible to multiple interpretations.”139  Bearing this out, courts and commentators have been 
unable to come to any agreement on the meaning of Nicastro, other than perhaps some consensus 
that no significant guidance can be gleaned from it.    
 
i. Public and Scholarly Reaction 
 
The Court’s split decision in Nicastro, after its long silence on personal jurisdiction 
issues, also predictably generated quite a bit of commentary.  Some commentators, particularly 
those sympathetic to the defense side of the civil litigation bar, were quick to declare an end to 
the “foreseeability” analysis put forward by Justice Brennan in Asahi.140  Similarly, many 
observers more sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ side of the equation were quick to sound the alarm 
that Nicastro marked the beginning of an age where foreign corporations can easily insulate 
themselves from suit in the United States.141   However, most initial reaction and analysis 
focused on the continuing uncertainty the decision maintained from Asahi.142 
                                                 
139 State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company, -- S.W.3d --, 2013 WL 1248285, at *29 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2013). 
140 See, e.g., Kim M. Watterson & Paige H. Forster, Where Can You Sue?- International Arena- Personal 
Jurisdiction- Due Process, Kimbusinesslaw.com, Jun. 29, 2011, http://kimbusinesslaw.com/2011/07/10/where-can-
you-sue-international-arena-personal-jurisdiction-due-process/ (“McIntyre . . . provide[s] solid footing on which a 
defendant can fight jurisdiction in any state where it has not “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities, even if its products make their way to that forum. Under McIntyre, courts going forward will 
look at the defendant’s conduct in targeting the forum state, rather than the foreseeability that the defendant would 
be sued there. The decision adds a welcome level of clarity and concreteness to the personal jurisdiction inquiry.”); 
Drug and Device Law, Personal Jurisdiction 2.0, http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/07/personal-
jurisdiction-20.html (Jul. 14, 2011) (“[I]t seems pretty clear that [Justices Breyer and Alito] are two more votes [in 
addition to the plurality] against the dissent’s – and the Brennan Asahi concurrence’s – reliance on pure 
foreseeability as sufficient for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction.  That issue seems dead.”).   
141 See, e.g., Press Release, American Association for Justice, SCOTUS Ruling in McIntyre v. Nicastro Adds 
Obstacles to Holding Foreign Corporations Accountable in the U.S. (Jun. 27, 2011) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro today makes it more difficult to hold foreign manufacturers accountable 
in the U.S. court system”); Maxwell Kennerly, Supreme Court Term In Review For Consumers, Employees and 
Injured Persons, Litigation and Trial, http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/07/articles/attorney/personal-injury-
1/supreme-court-term-in-review-for-consumers-employees-and-injured-persons/ (Jul. 5, 2011) (“[Nicastro] makes it 
 Later scholarly reaction has been similarly varied.  Law review pieces have interpreted 
Nicastro to be everything from the harbinger of a new era of virtual immunity from suit for 
foreign defendants in the United States143 to suggesting that the combination of the views of the 
dissent and the concurrence signals the court’s willingness “to once again adjust its personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence to more effectively contend with the modern economy.”144  Still, most 
reaction (like this article) laments the lack of guidance provided by Nicastro’s split decision after 
so many years of silence from the Court.145  
 
ii. The Marks Test 
                                                                                                                                                             
harder [to] hold foreign companies accountable for dangerous products, since the foreign companies typically 
conduct their activities through distributors”).   
142 See, e.g., Buehler, supra note 87, at 120 (after Nicastro, “the stream of commerce doctrine will be very much in 
flux in the years ahead”); Howard Wasserman, Clarifying personal jurisdiction . . . or not, PrawfsBlawg, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personal-jurisdiction-or-not.html (Jun. 28, 2011) 
(“As we all remember from 1L, the Asahi Court divided 4-4-1[.] . . . Twenty-five years later, still no resolution. Four 
justices, lead by Justice Kennedy, emphatically rejected the Brennan view[.] . . . But we still do not have a majority 
view on the question. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Alito, to again punt the 
question.”); Kendall Gray, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro: Declarifying Asahi, The Appellate Record, 
http://www.appellaterecord.com/2011/06/articles/new-opinions/j-mcintyre-machinery-v-nicastro-declarifying-asahi/ 
(Jun. 28, 2011) (“Nicastro gave the Court a chance to pick [between the competing approaches in Asahi]. But alas, 
five cats could not be herded into a single corral.” ; “For want of a fifth vote, we are about 14,000 words the richer 
after today's three opinions, but none the wiser.) 
143 See Kristianna L. Sciarra, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Anaylisis of J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 31 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 195, 195 (2013) (“Following the Supreme Court's recent decision in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a foreign corporation can now deliberately target the United States market and sell 
products anywhere in the country but escape personal jurisdiction in a state where one of its products injures a 
customer as long as the corporation did not 'purposefully avail' itself of the market in that particular state.”). 
144 See Johnjerica Hodge, Minimum Contacts in the Global Economy: A Critical Guide to J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 64 ALA. L. REV. 417, 418-20 (2012). 
145 See, e.g., Danielle Tarin and Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining The Due-Process Contours of General 
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. Int'l Bus. & L. 49, 49 (2012) (describing Nicastro as a “missed . . . 
opportunity to provide needed guidance to state and federal courts tasked with determining the level of business 
contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a forum's general personal jurisdiction.”); Simpson-Wood, supra 
note 25, at 124 n.74.  
 Under the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Marks v. United States,146 the way to divine 
a binding rule from a decision with no majority opinion such as Nicastro is to look for the 
“position taken by those Members [of the Court] who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds[.]”147  However, the Court has, on at least two occasions, questioned the 
workability of this rule, noting that it is “is more easily stated than applied” and declining to 
“pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and 
divided the lower courts that have considered it.”148   
 
Even if the Marks test remains viable, it is not particularly helpful in this case.  It does 
seem clear that the Members of the Court who “concurred in the judgmen[t]” on the narrowest 
ground appear to be Justices Breyer and Alito.  However, their concurrence explicitly disclaims 
the creation of any “new” personal jurisdiction rules, noting that “resolving this case requires no 
more than adhering to our precedents” which, in the concurrence’s view, have never allowed “a 
single isolated sale” in a forum to form the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.149  
Therefore, at most, Nicastro stands for the proposition that a single sale from a national 
distributor to a particular state does not subject the manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in that 
                                                 
146 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
147 Id. at 193 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
148 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 745-746 
(1994) (quotations omitted)); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (ROBERTS, C.J., 
concurring) (lamenting that even with the Marks test, when the Supreme Court fails to reach a majority opinion, 
“[l]ower courts [must] feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”). 
149 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2792 (BREYER, J., concurring in the judgment)  
state, but this proposition is of limited value to manufacturers seeking to plan for or avoid 
liability in particular jurisdictions.150   
 
A manufacturer cannot be expected to tell its distributor to only make (at most) a single 
sale of a particular product in a jurisdiction.  In fact, such an instruction might even constitute the 
type of particularized targeting of a sovereign required by the plurality, ensnaring the 
manufacturer in the jurisdiction they were attempting to avoid.  Also, while this “rule of one” 
makes some sense in the context of the $ 24,900 machine at issue in Nicastro, it starts to loose 
coherence when applied to other types of goods.151  A company selling prescription drugs to a 
national distributor cannot practically limit itself to “one sale” in any jurisdiction even if it does 
not target any particular jurisdiction, while a company selling private jets may adhere to this 
limit and be subject to personal jurisdiction anyway because of the large amount of purposeful 
contacts that would probably be required to make such a sale.  Thus, the Marks test is unlikely to 
provide much relief from Nicastro’s opacity.     
 
iii. Court Reaction 
 
                                                 
150 See Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7  (S.D. Miss. Sep. 23, 2011) (“As Justice Breyer 
declined to choose between the Asahi plurality opinions, McIntyre is rather limited in its applicability. It does not 
provide the Court with grounds to depart from the Fifth Circuit precedents establishing Justice Brennan's Asahi 
opinion as the controlling analysis. At best, it is applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that it 
does.”) 
151 See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2803 n.15 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting)  (“A $24,900 shearing machine . . . is unlikely to 
sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given state . . . had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of 
flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to 
suit in that State.”) (citations omitted).  
Not surprisingly, courts have not found Nicastro particularly helpful in settling 
jurisdictional disputes over the stream of commerce doctrine.  Despite the hopes of critics of a 
broad stream of commerce test and the fears of a broad test’s supporters, courts have mostly 
found Justice Breyer’s opinion controlling—and mostly found that it does not have much to say.  
Two circuit courts, that have taken an in depth look at Nicastro have reached the conclusion that, 
given the narrowness of Justice Breyer’s opinion, the end result of Nicastro is that “the law 
remains the same” as it was before, “including the conflicting articulations of [the stream of 
commerce] theory in Asahi[.]”152  Similarly, state courts have largely declined to alter their pre-
existing jurisdictional framework based on Nicastro, even when those frameworks would seem 
to conflict with the plurality’s approach.153  
 
For example, the Fifth Circuit—which had previously adopted a test similar to Justice 
Brennan’s Asahi approach for stream of commerce cases—dealt with the impact of Nicastro very 
directly in a case bearing striking similarities to Nicastro, Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering.154  
In that case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a products liability claim against an Irish company that 
                                                 
152 See Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424, at *11 (5th Cir. May 9, 2013); AFTG-TG, 
LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
153 See, e.g., Russell v. SNFA, No. 113909, 2013 Ill. LEXIS 557, at *36-40 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2013) (“McIntyre has not 
definitively clarified the proper application of the stream of commerce theory”); Sumatra Tobacco, 2013 WL 
1248285, at *27 (“Most courts that have applied the Marks rule to J. McIntyre Machinery have determined that 
Justice Breyer's opinion was the judgment that concurred "on the narrowest grounds.” . . . Nevertheless, while 
Justice Breyer's opinion may be controlling, it fails to resolve the United States Supreme Court's impasse over the 
stream of commerce theory and, therefore, leaves existing law undisturbed”) (collecting cases); Willemsen v. 
Invacare Corp., 282 P. 3d 867, 875 (Or. 2012) (“If [the Nicastro plurality] opinion were controlling, it might be 
difficult for plaintiff to show that, on this record, CTE's contacts with Oregon were sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction over it. As explained above, however, the rule that the Court announced in Marks for construing 
splintered decisions leads us to conclude that the rationale expressed in Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the 
judgment controls our resolution of this case.”). 
154 Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424, at *1. 
hired an Ohio based distributor to distribute its forklifts.155  The plaintiff’s husband was killed by 
an allegedly defective forklift while working at his job in Mississippi.156  The plaintiff sued both 
the distributor and the manufacturer in federal court in Mississippi, and the district court denied 
the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.157  Like the manufacturer 
in Nicastro, the manufacturer in Ainsworth did not specifically direct any of its products to the 
state of Mississippi but rather hired its distributor to distribute its products in the United States 
generally.158 The manufacturer did nothing to limit the scope of the distributor’s sales of its 
products by state.159   
 
The Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that its stream of commerce test160 is “in 
tension with the plurality opinion” in Nicastro, but declined to change that test in light of 
Nicastro.161  Instead, the court found that the plurality was “not binding precedent” and applied 
the Marks test to determine that Justice Breyer’s opinion was the controlling opinion in 
                                                 
155 Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424, at *1. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at *10-11. 
159 Id. 
160 That test allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where a court “finds that the 
defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by or 
used by consumers in the forum state.”  Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424, at *5 (quotations and citations 
omitted).  “Under that test, ‘mere foreseeability or awareness [is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal 
jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce,’ but 
‘[t]he defendant's contacts must be more than 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the unilateral activity of 
another party or third person.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
161 Id. at *9-8. 
Nicastro.162  It found, echoing the Federal Circuit’s similar conclusion, that Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence did not require the abandonment of the Brennan-like approach the Fifth Circuit had 
previously adopted.163  The court found that all Justice Breyer’s opinion stood for was that a 
“single isolated sale” could not support jurisdiction.164  In this case, since the manufacturer had 
sold 203 forklifts worth nearly four million dollars in Mississippi, the court found the exercise of 
jurisdictional compatible with Justice Breyer’s opinion and affirmed the district court.165  
 
The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Russell v. SNFA.166  Although 
the court acknowledged the “isolated sale” rule from the Nicastro concurrence, it rejected the 
defendant’s argument that Justice Breyer also endorsed Justice O’Connor’s Asahi approach.167  
Accordingly, as it had done in the past, the court declined to adopt either the broad or narrow 
theory of the stream of commerce doctrine articulated in the dueling opinions in Asahi and 
Nicastro.168 
  
Other courts have purported to glean slightly more from Nicastro.  In Bombardier v. Dow 
Chemical, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the plurality and concurrence agreed 
                                                 
162 Id. at *7-8. 
163 Id. at *8-11 (citing AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
164 Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424 at *8-11.  
165 Id. at *10-11 
166 No. 113909, 2013 Ill. LEXIS 557, at *36-40 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2013). 
167 Id. (“Justice Breyer quite clearly disagreed with the plurality’s decision to rely on ‘strict rules’ to limit 
jurisdiction to only situations when the defendant intended to submit to a state’s sovereign power.”). 
168 Id. at *40.  The court concluded in that particular case that it need not decide between the competing approaches 
because the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois under either one because the defendant 
had taken specific steps to target Illinois as a market for its products.  
that “mere foreseeability, at least where products are not sold in a state as part of the regular and 
anticipated flow of commerce into that state, is not enough to establish minimum contacts with 
the forum state.”169  However, the court found that beyond this conclusion (which, arguably was 
evident before Nicastro anyway170), the opinions in Nicastro did “not significantly add to the 
state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.”171  Other courts have similarly concluded that a test 
based on foreseeability alone is ruled out by Nicastro.172 
 
There are a few outlier courts who have gone even further.  For example, in Smith v. 
Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.,173 the court determined that the “common denominator of the 
Court's reasoning and a position approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment is 
the ‘stream of commerce plus’ rubric enunciated in an opinion by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.”174  
The court pointed to Justice Breyer’s approving citation of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion in 
his analysis as proof that “six Justices agree[d] [that] at a minimum, the limitations of Justice 
                                                 
169 Bombardier v. Dow Chem. Canada, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 399, at *9 (2013). 
170 Indeed, Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion itself endorses the “regular flow” concept.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 
(“The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”) (BRENNAN, J. concurring). 
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., Windsor v. Spinner Industry Co., Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011) (“McIntyre clearly 
rejects foreseeability as the standard for personal jurisdiction.”).  At least one court also found that Nicastro stood 
for the proposition that targeting a national market was insufficient to give rise to specific jurisdiction in any one 
state.  See Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J. 2011) (“[W]hether or not the 
plurality's strict rule is the de facto standard for stream of commerce cases going forward, there is no doubt that 
Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the 
forum States.”). 
173 840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012). 
174 Id. at 930 (some internal quotations omitted). 
O'Connor's test should be applied.”175  Similarly, in Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. 
Construction Navale Bordeaux,176 the court cited Justice Breyer’s opinion to justify applying 
Justice O’Connor’s Asahi test to a motion to dismiss by a foreign defendant.177   
 
However, cases applying this interpretation are not widespread and with good reason.178  
It is hard to justify reading Justice Breyer’s opinion as changing the status quo when he explicitly 
disclaimed doing so in his own opinion.  He stated flatly that Nicastro presented “an unsuitable 
vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules” and that 
resolving the case simply required “adher[ing] strictly to [the Court’s] precedents.”179  Although 
Justice Breyer does cite Justice O’Connor’s “something more” rule from Asahi, in that very same 
string citation, he also cites Justice Brennan’s distinction between the regular and anticipated 
flow of commerce and the occasional “eddy.”180  Justice Breyer was merely using these citations 
to support his argument that a “single isolated sale” cannot give rise to jurisdiction under any of 
the tests articulated by Asahi, not to endorse one test over another. 181 
                                                 
175 Id. at 931.  
176 No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011). 
177 Id. at *5. 
178 See Buehler, supra note 87, at 120 (“[I]t would be a mistake for lower courts and scholars to overreact to the 
Nicastro Court’s limited holding. Justice Breyer did not reject the plurality’s rule or the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s approach out of hand . . . . For now, the law remains unsettled.”). 
179 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (BREYER, J. concurring). 
180 Id. at 2792.  He also cited Justice Stevens’ opinion for the proposition that the “the volume, the value, and the 
hazardous character" of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry[.]”  Id. 
181 This is a somewhat dubious argument with respect to Justice Brennan’s approach.  Although Justice Brennan 
does distinguish between the usual flow and the eddies, that distinction had much more to do with whether the 
movement of the defendant’s products could have been anticipated by the defendant, rather than what the volume of 
those products happened to be.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (“The stream of commerce 
refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture 
 Thus, except perhaps in situations involving a single sale, Nicastro leaves courts without 
guidance about the proper application of the stream of commerce doctrine, particularly in the 
context of foreign manufacturers.  While the Nicastro plurality provides a lot of ammunition for 
defense arguments against assertions of personal jurisdiction, Nicastro does not lay out a clear 
rule that will be of much help to foreign manufacturers in structuring their conduct to avoid (or 
account for) potential liability in particular jurisdictions.  Instead, the decision in Nicastro leaves 
foreign manufacturers, distributors and consumers (not to mention litigation attorneys) to “feel 
their way on a case-by-case basis” without definitive guidance from the Court.182 
 
IV. Predictability In Personal Jurisdiction Is Critical 
 
This state of affairs is unacceptable, both from an economic and legal standpoint.  
International manufacturers seeking entry into the American market and the domestic 
distributors who sell their products have no way to apportion the risk of liability between 
themselves, or to plan to avoid liability in certain jurisdictions altogether.  This may make 
foreign manufacturers likely to raise prices to account for this uncertainty, or hesitate to enter the 
American market altogether.183   
                                                                                                                                                             
to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed 
in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”) (emphasis added).  It is hard to 
argue that J. McIntyre could not have anticipated that one of its machines could end up in New Jersey.  Nicastro, 
131 S.Ct. at 2801 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). 
182 See Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (ROBERTS, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
183 See Brief of the Organization for International Investment and Association of International Automobile 
Manufacturers Inc. as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 10, Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 
564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (noting that several studies have concluded that unpredictability 
in the US legal market is one of the top concerns of businesses considering entering the American market).  
 At the same time, from a doctrinal perspective, this situation creates exactly the situation 
that Justices with nearly all perspectives on personal jurisdiction jurisprudence have routinely 
said they were seeking to avoid: placing potential defendants in a situation where they are unsure 
whether they will be subject to liability.  Placing defendants in this situation does not comport 
with the traditional notions of fairness that personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause is 
supposed to be based upon.  In other words, the uncertainty created by the Court’s inability to 
reach a consensus on this issue may itself be creating violations of defendants’ due process 
rights.  
 
a. International companies seeking entry to the US market and their domestic 
distributors cannot apportion the risk of liability between themselves or 
incorporate the costs of risk into their products without a clearer rule. 
 
Lack of clarity about personal jurisdiction rules creates a lack of clarity about the risk of 
liability that a manufacturer or distributor will be subject to because of variations in the product 
liability law and related procedure of different forums.  Although it is true in theory that the 
choice of the forum for a lawsuit does not necessarily require the application of that forum’s law, 
as Professor Daniel Klerman demonstrated in a recent article, in practice, the choice of forum has 
a substantial effect on the choice of law and ultimately the outcome of product liability suits.184  
Most obviously, different jurisdictions have different choice of law rules, so the choice of forum 
                                                 
184 See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566. 
in that sense literally dictates the choice of law.185  Moreover, “most choice-of-law 
methodologies are relatively malleable, and many commentators have noted that judges 
frequently conclude that choice-of-law principles require application of the forum state’s 
substantive law.”186  Even if a forum does choose to apply another state’s law, it will still apply 
its own procedural rules,187 which can have a substantial impact on liability and the extent of 
damages.188   Finally, judicial selection methods and the composition of juries vary from forum 
to forum, which can also have a substantial impact on the outcome of a case.189  Thus, the lack of 
clear jurisdictional rules leaves companies selling across state and international boundaries 
                                                 
185 See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566. 
186 Id. at 1566 & n.50. 
187 See, e.g., GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (3d ed. 1963). 
188 Id. at 1566.  For example, some states limit the availability of punitive damages, and one state and many foreign 
jurisdictions disallow them altogether.  See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1604(3) (limiting punitive damages awards to 
$250,000 dollars or three times the compensatory damages award); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-4 (limiting punitive 
damages awards to $50,000 or three times the compensatory damages award); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. (2010) 
(limiting punitive damages awards to $350,000 regardless of the compensatory damages award); Dailey v. N. Coast 
Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) (noting that punitive damages are not available under Washington 
law); Jessica J. Berch, The Need for Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards by the European Union,  19 
MINN. J. OF INT’L LAW 55, 78 (noting that no European Union countries other than the United Kingdom allow the 
award of punitive damages).  Additionally, states have widely divergent standards standards for determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony—an issue that often has a determinative impact on product liability litigation.  
Compare McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that differences in the 
Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of evidence required the adoption of a heightened standard for 
the admissibility of expert testimony; “This distinction indicates that the probative force of the testimony must be 
stronger before it is admitted in Tennessee.”) (quotations and citations omitted) with State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d 
725, 730-32 (Wis. App. 2008) (Applying a “relevancy test” that is less strict than Daubert to the admissibility of 
expert testimony); see, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health. 
S59, S59 (2005) (noting that the outcome of a Daubert motion can be dispositive in many civil cases). 
189 Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566.  Indeed, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Nicastro recognizes that there are wide 
disparities in how states apply their products liability laws in practice.  See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2794  (BREYER, J. 
concurring) (noting that in one study the percentage of plaintiff winners in tort trials among 46 populous counties, 
ranged from 17.9% (in Worcester, Mass.) to 69.1% (in Milwaukee, Wis.)) (citing Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Bulletin, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, p. 11). 
unable to determine the degree of liability they may be opening themselves up to with their 
conduct. 
     
This uncertainty is economically troublesome for at least three reasons.  First, 
international manufactures are unable to apportion the risk of liability appropriately between 
themselves and domestic distributors without knowing the types of liability risks to which they 
are being subject. Second, companies may not appropriately account for the risk of liability in 
setting their prices, undermining the “signaling” affect product liability rules are supposed to 
create for consumers.  Third, companies may not be able to appropriately account for the 
differing risks of liability created by different state tort law regimes. 
 
i. Personal Jurisdiction Uncertainty Impedes Efficient Transactions Between 
Distributors and Manufacturers 
 
When an international company wants to distribute its products in the United States, it is 
often easiest for that company to work through a domestic distributor.190  Domestic distribution 
of foreign products is a multi-billion dollar business in the United States. 191  Unclear personal 
jurisdiction rules can present a problem for distributors and manufactures in this system because 
                                                 
190 See Amit K. Ghosh, W. Benoy Joseph, John T. Gardner, and Sharon V. Thach, Understanding industrial 
distributors' expectations of benefits from relationships with suppliers, 19 J. BUS. & INDUS. MARKETING 433, 434-35 
(noting that “The status of distributors has risen almost continuously over the past few decades as they increase their 
domination over the sales channel.  The reduction of trade barriers and the resultant increase in potential suppliers 
has further enhanced the nature of vertical competition, thereby increasing the importance of distributors.”) 
(citations omitted). 
191 See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Goods Trade: 
Imports & Exports by Related-Parties 2012, at 4 (May 2, 2013), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-
Release/2012pr/aip/related_party/rp12.pdf (noting that there were over 1 trillion dollars worth of goods imported 
into the United States in 2012 by non-related parties, nearly 50% of the total imports for that year). 
of the existence of strict liability combined with joint and several liability in products liability 
cases.   
 
Because of strict product liability rules, manufacturers and their distributors can both be 
on the hook for a plaintiff’s injuries in a product liability case.192  In a case where the 
manufacturer and the distributor are both subject to personal jurisdiction, the burden of 
defending such a claim (and of paying any settlement or judgment) will fall on both the 
manufacturer and the distributor.  Conversely, in a case where the manufacturer cannot be 
subject to personal jurisdiction (like in Nicastro itself), the distributor is left holding the bag and 
must take the entire burden of defending the claim (and of potential liability) onto its own 
shoulders. 
 
In a world where the Nicastro dissent’s “expectations” based test was applied, the former 
situation would occur much more often.193  In a world where the Nicastro plurality’s test was 
applied, the latter situation would be more common.194  If the “expectations” test were the law, 
manufacturers and distributors would likely buy an amount of liability insurance coverage 
consummate with the risks of defending these claims (but doing not doing so alone).  If the 
plurality’s test were the law, distributors would either have to purchase more liability insurance 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., JAMES A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.64 (1977). 
193 Indeed, it would seem that it would almost always work that way assuming that the manufacturer had some 
understanding of the territory in which the distributor was selling its products. 
 
194 Although it would not necessarily always be that way since a manufacturer could take specific actions that would 
subject it to jurisdiction in a given forum, such as specifically directing a distributor to target a specific state, or 
advertising in that state independently of the distributor.  
 
(and pass these costs onto consumers and/or demand lower prices from manufacturers) or seek 
broad indemnification clauses in purchase contracts with foreign manufacturers. 
 
Unfortunately, distributors and manufacturers do not live in either of these worlds.  
Instead, they must continue these transactions in an environment where the manufacturer’s level 
of exposure to personal jurisdiction (and by extension, liability), is unclear.  Because of this, 
negotiations between manufacturers and distributors will be impeded, and deals will be made 
that may ultimately turn out to have been inefficient.  Distributors may end up “holding the bag” 
when they did not (and could not) anticipate doing so.  Or, manufacturers may have to pay 
“twice” for the risk of liability, once by having to sell to a distributor at lower prices to account 
for the distributor’s risk of being subject to liability alone and again if it turns out that the 
manufacturer actually is subject to suit after all.  
 
ii. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals Reflecting 
Product Safety 
 
Another problem with this uncertainty is that it undermines one of the core purposes of 
tort liability in general, and strict product liability in particular, building the “riskiness” of a 
product into its price as a “signal” to consumers.195  Most people lack information about the 
safety of consumer products.  However, product liability suits force manufacturers to either 
change their products to make them safer or raise prices of their products to reflect the risk of 
liability that those products carry.  When manufactures do that, consumers can make optimal 
                                                 
195 See Buehler, supra note 87, at 123. 
 
purchasing decisions even without knowing technical information about product safety, because 
the price they pay will reflect the full “cost” of the product, including its risk of causing harm.196 
 
Because uncertain jurisdictional rules make it difficult for distributors and manufacturers 
to properly apportion the risk of liability between themselves, the ultimate result will likely be 
that products’ end prices to consumers may be increased to account for this uncertainty.  This 
price increase will not be a “signal” of anything other than the difficulty of doing business in an 
uncertain legal environment, which may drown out any price signaling that would differentiate 
products based on the actual level of risk associated with them. 
 
iii. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals Reflecting 
Variations in State Law 
 
The current regime (or lack thereof) also undermines another set of pricing “signals”: 
those associated with different states’ product liability rules.  Because different states have 
different substantive and procedural rules governing liability, some states will expose 
manufacturers to more exacting scrutiny of their products by the court system.  This increased 
scrutiny has two primary effects in these jurisdictions: increased costs for manufactures and 
increased safety of consumer products.  When manufacturers raise their prices (or abandon a 
jurisdiction altogether) in response to such rules, it gives consumers a “signal” that they are 
paying for the higher safety level imposed by their state’s law.  By reading these signals, 
consumers can balance the level of consumer protection they desire with the pricing and 
                                                 
196 Id. 
availability of products they want by choosing what jurisdictions to purchase products in (and/or 
where to live).197   
 
Just like the direct signaling of product safety, signals about state law are only effective if 
manufacturers and consumers are able to predict with some reliability which laws (and which 
courts) will govern each purchase.  For the reasons discussed above in part IV(a), being subject 
to personal jurisdiction in a state at least results in the application of that state’s procedural rules 
and often results in being subject to the substantive law of that state as well.  Because of the 
uncertainty that currently exists in this area, manufacturers often will be unable to build the 
“price” of different states’ tort laws into their products because they will not know whether they 
can be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.  Thus, as long as the “stream of commerce” 
doctrine remains undefined, consumers not get the benefit of the pricing signals reflecting state 
law differences.  Instead, consumers may end up “paying for” consumer protections they are not 
getting if a manufacturer erroneously believes it will be subject to jurisdiction in a particular 
state and raises prices on that basis.  Conversely, manufacturers may be unexpectedly subject to 
liability that they were unable to price into their products. 
 
                                                 
197 Just like consumers without adequate information about product safety can benefit from price-signaling, so too 
can consumers without adequate information about applicable legal rules benefit from price signaling.  Consumers 
lacking information about comparative tort law regimes are likely to be even more common than those with little 
knowledge of relative product safety.  See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1572-74 (noting that it would be “absurd” to 
suggest that “consumers . . . have detailed knowledge of the laws and procedures of the relevant states so that they 
could figure out how each state's laws and procedures impact the amount they would be willing to pay for [a] 
product and so that they could make informed choices between competing products. . . . Very few tort professors 
could tell you whether Ohio or Colorado has more favorable product liability law, much less put a dollar amount on 
the difference. In addition, it is simply not worth anyone's time to figure out the relevant laws and their impacts. The 
probability of an actionable accident for any mass-produced product is negligible, so it would be irrational for any 
consumer to spend the time to read a forum-selection clause much less research the relevant state's laws or try to 
calculate how those laws affect their valuation of the product.”). 
 
  Thus, bringing clarity to the stream of commerce theory would provide positive 
economic benefits by removing the cloud of uncertainty hanging over consumers, distributors, 
and manufacturers. 
 
b. Due Process Requires A Clear Rule 
 
Economic concerns aside, the lack of a clear rule on the stream of commerce test creates 
a level of uncertainty that is itself a violation of the due process principles that have formed the 
underpinning of modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  The Court has emphasized that 
predictability for the defendant is an important part of what makes the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction fair.  Indeed, this animating principle underlies both the Nicastro plurality and 
dissent’s approach to the stream of commerce test.   However, by declining to choose between 
these competing approaches, the Court has undermined this principle by creating the exact 
unpredictability that an overwhelming majority of the current Court (and its Members since 
International Shoe) has agreed is unacceptable under the Due Process Clause. 
 
Ever since the introduction of the minimum contacts test in International Shoe, the Court 
has emphasized that whether a defendant subjects itself to personal jurisdiction should be, on 
some level, entirely within the defendant’s control.198  Even prior to the “International Shoe era” 
of personal jurisdiction, the doctrine has always been aimed at allowing the defendant to make a 
choice to submit him or herself (or itself) to personal jurisdiction.  Under the prior regime, a 
defendant could do that simply by choosing whether or not to be physically present in the 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
forum.199  “Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam [was] 
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.  Hence his presence within the 
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally 
binding on him.”200  This system was justified in part because the defendant “voluntarily entered 
[the forum and] has no one but himself to blame” for being subject to suit there.201  
 
The modern stream of commerce debate focuses on the type of control that a defendant 
exercises (i.e., taking actions that foreseeably could lead to a product being sold in a forum vs. 
taking actions that are directly targeted to a forum), but all sides agree that the defendant’s 
choices should ultimately underlie the personal jurisdiction inquiry.  The debate is really just 
over what type of choices are relevant. 
 
The Court recognized as much in two of its seminal personal jurisdiction opinions, World 
Wide Volkswagen and Burger King.  In World Wide Volkswagen, the Court emphasized that 
subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction in Oklahoma would not comport with due process 
because one of the primary purposes of the Due Process Clause, “ensuring the orderly 
administration of the laws,” would be undermined by creating a system where defendants were 
                                                 
199 See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610-11 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) (noting the historical practice of states exercising 
jurisdiction over any defendant who is physically present in the state). 
200 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
201 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 625 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); id. at 635-36 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(however murky the jurisprudential origins of transient jurisdiction, the fact that American courts have announced 
the rule for perhaps a century (first in dicta, more recently in holdings) provides a defendant voluntarily present in a 
particular State today "clear notice that [he] is subject to suit.").  In keeping with this justification, states traditionally 
exempted from valid service defendants who were coerced into entering the state.  See id. at 613 (opinion of SCALIA, 
J.). 
unable to “structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to whether that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”202   
 
Two of the three dissenters also agreed with the majority on the importance of allowing 
the defendant to structure its primary conduct to control its amenability to suit in a particular 
forum.203  Although they would have held that the act of selling a mobile product and being part 
of a national chain of dealerships was sufficient conduct to subject the defendant to jurisdiction 
in Oklahoma, they still understood due process as requiring that the defendant be put on notice 
that their activities could cause them to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.204 
 
In Burger King, a case that approved the exercise of jurisdiction by Florida courts over a 
Michigan franchisee of a Florida corporation, the Court made even clearer the importance of 
predictability in the personal jurisdiction inquiry.  The Court began its analysis by noting that the 
due process clause requires that potential defendants “have ‘fair warning that a particular activity 
may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”205  In this case, the Court held that 
the franchisee could be subject to jurisdiction in Florida because he had “deliberately reached 
                                                 
202 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
203 See id. at 316 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).  The exception was Justice Brennan who argued for a rule based on the 
contacts between both parties and the forum, where the defendant’s contacts with the forum would not necessarily 
be decisive.  See id. at 309-12 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).  However, by the time he wrote the opinion of the Court in 
Burger King, Justice Brennan apparently came to agree that a defendant should be able to choose, through its 
actions, which forums it will be subject to jurisdiction in.  See 471 U.S. at 475-76.   
204 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 316 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (“a local automobile dealer who makes 
himself part of a nationwide network of dealerships can fairly expect that the cars they sell may cause injury in 
distant States and that they may be called on to defend a resulting lawsuit there”). 
205 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring)) 
(alteration in original). 
out” to the Florida corporation to enter into the franchise agreement, making it reasonably 
foreseeable that he would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida if a dispute arose out of 
that agreement.206 
 
Thus, concerns about predictability have long been important to the personal jurisdiction 
inquiry.  Yet, the concurrence’s indecision in Nicastro has left manufacturers in a situation 
where, even with the help of sophisticated lawyers, they cannot structure their primary conduct 
to avoid or accept liability in particular forums.  Instead they are relegated to guessing whether 
courts in a particular jurisdiction will apply the plurality’s approach, the dissent’s approach, or 
some combination of the two.  This state of affairs neither “ensur[s] the orderly administration of 
the laws,” nor gives defendants “fair warning that [their] activit[ies] may subject [them] to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”207    
   
V. Either The Plurality Of The Dissent’s Approach Can Be Readily Applied To The 
“Modern” Issues That Troubled the Concurrence 
 
The concurrence’s primary justification208 for declining to settle the stream of commerce 
issue was that making such a choice was inappropriate in Nicastro because the case did not 
                                                 
206 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80, 482, 487. 
207 See also S. Wilson Quick, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 547, 550 (2012) (“The lack of predictability resulting from the 
state of jurisdictional analysis is inefficient and diametrically opposed to due process.”). 
208 The concurrence also mentioned that it might be more appropriate to finally settle the issue in a case where the 
Solicitor General participated.  Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).  This objection is puzzling.  The 
fate of the stream of commerce doctrine will primarily impact the ability of state courts to adjudicate disputes arising 
under state law, not federal courts.  See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(k) (allowing the assertion of personal jurisdiction in 
lawsuits arising under federal law where “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
“implicate modern concerns.”  These modern concerns include situations where a company 
“targets the world by selling products from its Web site” or “consigns products through an 
intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfils the orders” or “market[s] its 
products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum.”209  In the 
concurrence’s view, without a case that presented such concerns, it would be inappropriate to 
“work such a change in the law the way either the plurality or the New Jersey Supreme Court 
suggest[ed].”210   
 
On the surface, this seems like a reasonable and pragmatic approach, but a closer 
examination reveals that this hesitation is unjustified.  As the plurality points out, common law 
processes always work by establishing broad principles which are then adapted to specific 
situations, such as the ones the concurrence is concerned with: 
 
The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to 
judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice 
O'Connor’s opinion in Asahi, does not by itself resolve many 
difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases. 
The defendant's conduct and the economic realities of the market 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction”); Brief of Arkansas, Arizona, Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, & West Virginia as 
Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents at 1, Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 564 U.S. __, 131 
S.Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (noting the states “interest in the articulation of a clear rule governing personal 
jurisdiction in the products liability context to provide guidance to our courts and our citizens.”).  Moreover, nothing 
about Nicastro prevented the Court from calling for the Solicitor General’s views in that case.  
209 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
210 Id. at 2794. 
the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial 
exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of 
that principle.211 
 
More importantly, there are specific reasons to expect that choosing between the competing 
approaches to the stream of commerce theory would not present a problem with respect to the 
“modern concerns” identified by the concurrence.  Lower courts have already successfully 
applied both versions of the stream of commerce test to the e-commerce situations that give the 
concurrence pause.  The outcomes of these cases suggest that the plurality and dissent’s 
approaches actually would not differ as much in their application to e-commerce issues as they 
would in their application to more “traditional” cases like Nicastro.  Although one can 
imagine—as the concurrence does—cases involving the Internet where the stream of commerce 
rule would be decisive, these situations do not call for a fundamentally different analysis than the 
one called for in Nicastro.   
 
a. The Application of the Stream-of Commerce Test Is Usually Distinct From Issues 
Presented By The Internet 
 
 Courts adopting both approaches to the stream of commerce test appear to approach 
internet commerce the same way: by making a distinction between websites that are “passive” 
and websites that are “interactive.”212  Websites simply presenting information about a business 
                                                 
211 Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion). 
212See Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).  This test appears to 
have originated from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  See David 
that do not provide any option for communication or commerce between the user and the 
business are usually not considered “contacts” with any particular forum.213  Conversely, 
websites allowing the user to directly communicate with the company, such as by purchasing 
products, are considered significant “contacts” for purposes of the personal jurisdiction 
inquiry.214  The stream of commerce test is usually, at most, ancillary to these cases, which focus 
on objective characteristics of the websites at issue, rather than on the defendant’s awareness or 
intention.  
 
For example, in Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh 
Circuit, which applies Justice Brennan’s Asahi approach,215 affirmed a district court’s finding 
that Indiana lacked personal jurisdiction over a Danish manufacturer of a jack that allegedly 
caused the plaintiff’s death at his workplace.216  The defendant sold its products into the United 
States through a distributor in Florida, although the record did not reflect any sales into Indiana 
                                                                                                                                                             
Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Back to the Future: Revisiting Zippo in Light of “Modern Concerns”, 29 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231, 236-40 (2011). 
213 See, e.g., id. at 550 (“[A] defendant's maintenance of a passive website does not support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over that defendant in a particular forum just because the website can be accessed there.”) (collecting 
cases); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation whose internet contacts with the forum were “at most, passive”). 
214 See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centrucut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 329-31 (D.S.C. 1999) (describing the “sliding 
scale” of interactivity between websites “doing nothing more than advertising [a] product on the internet [and] 
‘interactive’ websites in which individuals enter into contracts with [companies] via the internet[.]”). 
215 See Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F. 2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Sullivan v. Author Solutions, Inc., 
No. 07-C-1137, 2008 WL 2937786, at *4 n.9 (E.D. Wis. Jul. 23, 2008) (finding the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
appropriate where “Here, defendant placed its books into the stream of commerce by delegating its printing and 
sales functions to its printers and distributors.  Defendant expected that the books printed and distributed by these 
entities would be distributed in all of the states they serviced.”). 
216 See Jennings, 383 F.3d at 548-49, 552. 
or the volume of total sales through the distributor.217  The defendant also maintained a website, 
in English, that was accessible throughout the United States.218  The website contained 
information about the defendant’s products and contact information, but did not allow consumers 
to place orders directly through the website.219   
 
The plaintiff argued that the website was sufficient to support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in Indiana since it was essentially soliciting business from anywhere, including 
Indiana, by being accessible from anywhere (and being available in English).220  The court 
rejected that argument as “sweep[ing] too broadly” since “it is unusual to find a company that 
does not maintain at least a passive website [so] [p]remising personal jurisdiction on the 
maintenance of website, without requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant 
and consumers . . ., would create almost universal personal jurisdiction[.]”221  The court found 
that since the defendant’s website allowed for no interaction at all and instead just made 
information available, it could not be a sufficient contact to support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in Indiana.222 
 
                                                 
217 See id. at 548.  Although it was clear that the jack at issue in the case was manufactured by the defendant, the 
record did not clearly reflect whether the jack was sold into Indiana through the distributor, directly from the 
manufacturer, or through some other channel.  See id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 549-50. 
221 Id. 
222 Jennings, 383 F.3d at 549-50. 
Separately, the court rejected the argument that an undetermined number of sales to the 
Florida distributor could support personal jurisdiction in Indiana because of a lack of evidence 
presented by the plaintiff regarding how the jack at issue in the case got to Indiana, and what the 
volume of sales was from the distributor to Indiana.223    
 
Similarly, in Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770 (D.S.C. 1999), a district court 
in a jurisdiction that has adopted Justice O’Connor’s Asahi approach,224 rejected the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction by South Carolina against a German manufacturer of paper shredders.225  
The plaintiff in that case was making a product liability claim against the manufacturer because 
of injuries she sustained from a paper shredder in her father’s office.226  The manufacturer sold 
its products to an American distributor,227 who then sold the shredders to a third company, which 
sold the shredder at issue to the plaintiff’s father’s employer.228  The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant was aware that its shredders could end up in South Carolina, and that the ‘additional 
conduct’ requirement of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi test was satisfied by the defendant 
maintaining a website accessible to South Carolina consumers, which the plaintiff attempted to 
equate with advertising in South Carolina.229 
 
                                                 
223 Id. at 550-51. 
224 See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 944-46 (4th Cir. 1994). 
225 69 F. Supp. 2d at 772-74. 
226 Id. at 772. 
227 Although the case does not explicitly mention where the distributor was based, it is apparent from the court’s 
analysis that the distributor must have been based in a state other than South Carolina. 
228 Id. at 772-74. 
229 Id. at 777. 
The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the website at issue was a “passive” website 
which only presented information about the defendant’s products and contact information.230  
The court noted that there was no evidence that the defendant had done anything to encourage 
South Carolina consumers to visit the website or that a substantial number of them had done 
so.231  Thus, the court concluded that there was no evidence “that this web site was directed at 
South Carolina any more than any other place in the world [and] [c]onsequently, . . . [the 
defendant’s] website cannot provide a basis for an assertion of personal jurisdiction[.]”232 
 
As these cases show, the issue of how websites impact the personal jurisdiction inquiry is 
analytically distinct from the issue of how to apply the stream of commerce test to the use of a 
distribution network, even when both issues are present in the same case.  In both Jennings and 
Brown the court looked at a passive website and applied the same test to reach the same 
conclusion, even though each jurisdiction applies a different version of the stream of commerce 
doctrine.  Jennings and Brown did analyze the defendant’s website in different parts of their 
analysis, with Jennings analyzing it as another potential contact to support jurisdiction and 
Brown analyzing it as a potential ‘something more’ under Justice O’Connor’s version of the 
stream of commerce test.  However, both courts applied the same, relatively well settled 
approach,233 to the actual determination of the website’s impact by looking at objective 
                                                 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 777-78. 
232 Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 778. 
233 Many have argued that the Zippo interactivity test is outmoded and should be replaced.  See, e.g., Swetnam-
Burland, supra note 212, at 238-43.  However, even if the interactivity test were to be replaced with something else, 
that analysis would likely focus either on other characteristics of the defendant’s web presence or on other contacts 
the defendant makes with the forum in the non-virtual world.  See id. at 249-50 (suggesting treating the internet as 
just another method of making a “contact” for purposes of personal jurisdiction, rather than as a contact in itself).  
characteristics of the websites in question: specifically, the level of interaction each website 
fostered with forum state consumers.  Thus, making a choice between the competing approaches 
to the stream of commerce from Asahi and Nicastro would make very little difference to the 
analysis of internet issues in personal jurisdiction cases. 
 
b. Either Version Of The Stream Of Commerce Test Is Readily Applicable To E-
Commerce 
  
The concurrence presents a few hypothetical situations that purport to explain why “modern 
concerns” must be present in a case deciding the stream of commerce question; however, none of 
these is persuasive.  The most obvious type of situation where the applicable stream of 
commerce test might be outcome determinative in an e-commerce case is one where a 
manufacturer sells its product over the Internet through third party such as Amazon or E-Bay.  
While this situation on the surface seems to present a novel question of “modern concerns,” it is 
actually not fundamentally different from what happened in Nicastro itself.   
 
The manufacturer in such a situation is using Amazon or E-Bay as its’ “distributor” and is 
targeting the United States as a whole (since the internet is accessible from anywhere), just as J. 
McIntyre did in a more traditional way by hiring its domestic distributor.  As demonstrated by 
the discussion above, the third party distributor (Amazon or E-Bay) would be subject to 
jurisdiction under the approach the Courts of Appeal have taken to Internet commerce in any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Such an analysis would still be distinct from the fundamental question of whether the manufacturing defendant must 
intentionally send its products directly to a particular forum, or whether the manufacturing defendant’s knowledge 
that a product is likely to end up in that forum is sufficient.   
state since they maintain an “interactive” websites.  Whether the manufacturer would be subject 
to jurisdiction would turn on exactly the same issues as whether J. McIntyre could be subject to 
jurisdiction in Nicastro.   
 
While the answers the plurality and the dissent give to that question diverge sharply, the 
answer is clear under either approach.  A manufacturer who provides its products to a third party 
seller who sells those products over the internet to a purchaser in a particular state would not be 
subject to personal jurisdiction under the plurality’s approach unless the manufacturer took some 
other action to specifically target that particular state (such as advertising its products in that 
state or designing its products for use in that state).  Conversely, under the dissent’s approach, 
since a manufacturer could reasonably expect that a product being sold over the internet by a 
third party could end up in any state, the manufacturer would be subject to jurisdiction in any 
state where the product was sold, without taking any additional action to target that state.  Thus, 
the issue presented in Nicastro regarding the stream of commerce test is independent from the 
issue of how to deal with issues presented by the internet.  
 
Finally, the concurrence suggests that, especially when applied to an internet based third 
party distributor, the plurality and the dissent’s approach could each lead to extreme and 
undesirable consequences in particular cases.  In critiquing the plurality, the concurrence implies 
that a corporation targeting its products “to the world” through a third party internet distributor 
could get away with not being subject to jurisdiction in any state because there would be no 
purposeful targeting of any given state.234  In critiquing the dissent, the concurrence suggests that 
                                                 
234 See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2793 (BREYER, J., concurring). 
a hapless small manufacturer, such as an Appalachian potter, who sells its products to a large 
national distributor, could be forced to defend lawsuits in “virtually any” jurisdiction in the 
United States.235  Neither of these critiques should have prevented the concurrence from 
fashioning a rule for at least two reasons. 
 
First, as with any clear legal rule, a clear stream of commerce rule would occasionally 
produce results that do not seem fair.  Nevertheless, this occasional unfairness is far outweighed 
by the unfairness created by a lack of any rule at all.  Once a clear rule is set and businesses are 
able to structure their primary conduct to avoid or account for the situations where they will be 
subject to personal jurisdiction, such ‘unfair’ situations will become less common. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, both approaches have sufficient flexibility to prevent (or at 
least potentially prevent) these seemingly unjust outcomes.  Where a corporation employs a 
distributor (over the internet or otherwise), to target the United States as a whole, the plurality 
specifically left the door open to a legislative solution, suggesting that “[i]t may be that . . . 
Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in” federal courts for state law claims 
against defendants with sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.236  Thus, to deal 
with corporations that target the United States as a whole, Congress could pass a statute 
empowering federal courts to hear those cases.237  And, of course, at least in the products liability 
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237 Another potential legislative solution is to require foreign manufacturers to consent to jurisdiction in a particular 
state as a condition of selling goods into the United States.  Several bills have been introduced to that effect.  See, 
e.g., H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. (2010); S.1606, 111th Cong. (2009). 
context, in most states the injured consumer would still have the option of suing the 
distributor.238 
 
As for the hypothetical Appalachian potter in a world governed by the dissent’s approach, the 
concurrence forgets that the stream of commerce test only deals with the first half of the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry, whether the defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with the forum 
to be subject to jurisdiction in that forum.  The second prong of the test, whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction in the particular case is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice would still have to be satisfied even where minimum contacts were established through 
the stream of commerce test.   
 
Indeed, Asahi itself is an illustration of this principal.  While Justice Brennan took the 
broader expectations or awareness based approach to the stream of commerce test, he and the 
three other Justices joining him agreed that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was still 
inappropriate in that case because it would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice to hale the Japanese part manufacturer into court in California in part because 
of the “severe” burden such a defense would place on the defendant.239  Such an approach would 
probably yield similar results for the Appalachian potter Justice Breyer’s concurrence is 
concerned about.240  
                                                 
238 See, e.g., DOOLEY, supra note 192, § 32.64. 
239 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16 (majority opinion). 
240 Indeed, as discussed in Part III, supra, the dissent in Nicastro elaborated on this point to suggest a distinction 
between “cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro, injured by the activity of a defendant engaged 
in interstate or international trade [where jurisdiction presumably would be consistent with fair play and substantial 
justice] and . . . cases in which the defendant is a natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal 
 Thus, either approach to the stream of commerce test would be readily applicable to cases 
involving modern technology and would apply to that area in much the same way as they would 
apply to cases not involving such technology.  Moreover, each test has either built-in or 
legislatively available mechanisms to prevent unfair results being created by their application to 
e-commerce cases. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
At the heart of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe has always been a concern for 
fairness and efficiency.  Yet, as the stream of commerce test stands now, personal jurisdiction is 
uniquely unfair to certain businesses and consumers who are left in uncertainty as to what 
conduct will subject a business to jurisdiction .  Such uncertainty is not just unfair; it is also 
economically detrimental since so much of today’s commerce flows through international 
channels.   
 
While adapting personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to products flowing through the 
international “stream of commerce” is a challenge, the Supreme Court laid out two clear and 
relatively easily applied approaches to the problem in Asahi and Nicastro.  As demonstrated 
above, the concurrence’s refusal to choose between the two approaches in Nicastro because of 
imagined “modern concerns” was both destructive and unnecessary.  Next time the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                             
involvements are largely home-based, i.e., entities without designes to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant 
markets.”  131 S.Ct. at 2804 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).  The dissent suggested that this approach “would, to a 
considerable extent, answer the concerns expressed by Justice Breyer.”  Id. at 2804 n.18. 
Court confronts the stream of commerce, hopefully it will not engage in such faux restraint, and 
instead will finally choose one of the clear approaches available to address this problem.  
